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In The
SUPREME COURT
Of The
STATE OF UTAH

-------------------------------------------------------CRAIG A. BLAMIRES,

*

Plaintiff-Appellant, *
vs.

*

BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY OF THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH,

*

Case No.
15676

*

Defendant-Respondent.*

-------------------------------------------------------BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Original proceeding to review a decision of the
Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security
of the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an original proceeding to review a decision
of the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission
of Utah which Board affirmed a decision of the Appeals
Referee of the Commission that plaintiff-appellant,
Craig Blarnires, was not eligible for unemployment cornpensation under the Utah Employment Security Act.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The question posed for determination is whether or
not appellant was in "employment" in his relationship
with Medexarn of Utah as defined by the Utah Employment
Security Act, Section 35-4-22

(j)

(1) Utah Code Annotated,

1953, and whether or not such services are excluded

under the provisions of Section 35-4-22 (j)

(5) Utah

Code Annotated, 1953.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On October 3, 1977, appellant, Craig Blarnires,
appealed to the Appeals Referee of the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Department of Employment Security from a decision
of a department representative dated September 22,
1977, wherein it was held that appellant was not "in

employment" within the meaning of the Utah Employment
Security Act.

The Appeals Referee on December 8, 1977,

issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Decision affirming the decision of the department representative declaring ·that appellant was not entitled to
unemployment compensation.

Appellant subsequently

appealed to the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission
of Utah.

After reviewing the record, the Board of

Review without making findings of fact or conclusions
of law of its own, affirmed the decision of the Appeals
Referee.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The decision of the representative of the Utah
Department of Employment Security upheld by the Appeals
Referee and the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission
of Utah is contrary to the law as supported by the
facts and should be reversed thereby allowing appellant,
Craig Blamires, unemployment compensation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant began working for Medexam of Utah sometime
during the month of September 1976.

(R.0036)

Appellant

had been doing the same kind of work for a company
named Body Metrics before beginning his employment
with Medexam and had been trained by Body Metrics.
(R.0036)

Consequently Medexam was pleased to have

appellant work for them because of his prior experience.
Appellant began his employment with Medexam as the
regional manager.

(R.0036)

Medexam is a corporation that performs physical
examinations or premedical examinations as required
by various life insurance companies for the purpose
of underwriting risks.

(R.0036)

Medexam would contact

and negotiate with various insurance companies agreeing
to do physical examinations on those persons who may
be applying for insurance from that particular company.
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-4Medexam, not appellant, would set the price that appellant
would charge for each of the examinations completed.
(R.0038)

Appellant was required to follow the prices

established by Medexam.

(R.0039)

As regional manager

appellant was to supervise the northern Utah and southern
Idaho areas and was to perform physical examinations
as well.

The central office of Medexam likewise performed

physical examinations at its office located in Salt
Lake City, Utah.

(R.

0037)

At the time appellant began his employment with
Medexam, he did not enter into a written agreement
with Medexam.

(R. 0037)

At the time he began his employment

with Medexam, appellant was directed by the president
of Medexam to work out of his home.

(R. 0037)

Later

he rented space in Ogden, Utah and signed the lease
in the name of Medexam.

(R.0044) In addition, appellant

obtained a telephone listing in the name of Medexam and
the obligation for the telephone was guaranteed by
the president of Medexam.

(R.0044)

The various insurance companies would direct their
applicants for insurance to contact one of the Medexam
offices.

The Medexam office for the Ogden, Utah area

was operated by appellant.

Appellant would submit
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1

-sto the central office of Medexam the names· of those
persons who had been examined by him together with
the name of the insurance company.

The insurance company

would be billed by the central office of Medexam and would
pay Medexam directly.

Medexam would then pay to appellant

10 percent of the fees collected while retaining 30
percent for itself.

(R.0041)

In approximately January

1977, the fee arrangement was changed so that appellant
received 90 percent of the fees generated while Medexam
retained 10 percent.

(R.0041)

Appellant established under the direction of Medexam
other branch offices in northern Utah and southern
Idaho.

Each branch office was operated by one person

generally out of that person's home.

The operator

would perform physical examinations but the fee to
be charged for such was controlled by the central office
of Medexam.

(R.0040-0042)

Appellant paid the operators

of the branches from funds he received from Medexam.
(R.0041)

The amounts paid by appellant to the branch

operators were the amounts suggested by Mr. Smith, president
of Medexam.

(R.0042)

Appellant was required by Medexam

to prepare a written list of goals and management objectives
and was to submit them to Medexam.

(R.0026)
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Appellant did not enter into any written agreement
with Medexam.

Medexam demanded that appellant sign

a document called a partnership agreement dated May 10,
1977.

(R.0027)

Medexam terminated appellant sometime

in May, 1977, and rehired him three days later.

(R.0047)

A dispute arose between appellant and Medexam as to
the payment of wages and appellant submitted his letter
of resignation on July 23, 1977.

(R. 0048)

Upon the

resignation of Mr. Blamires, Medexam took control of
the telephone number and place of business and began
immediately to continue the Medexarn operation.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPEALS REFEREE ERRED IN RULING THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT WITHIN "EMPLOYMENT" AS CONTEMPLATED BY THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT.
It is clear from the decision of the Appeals Referee
(R.0022-0024) that his decision was based on the fact
that Medexam maintained insufficient control over appellant
to bring the relationship between appellant and Medexarn
within the common-law definition of master-servant.
The Court's attention is invited to page 0024 of the Record.
There the Appeals Referee cited an American Jurisprudence
quotation relating to common-law definitions of what
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-7constitutes a master-servant relationship.

The Appeals

Referee then said,
"In the instant case there is no evidence that
Medexam exercised control as to the means and
manner of accomplishment.
CONCLUSION OF LAW:
The Appeals Referee therefore finds:
"During the base period July l, 1976, through
June 30, 1977, the claimant was not an employee
of Medexam but was self-employed, and during
the base period the claimant had insufficient
weeks of employment for eligibility." (R.0024)
The Appeals Referee erred in applying common-law
definitions of a master-servant relationship to the
present case before the Court.

In one of the leading

cases interpreting the Utah Employment Security Act,
the Court said in Creameries of America v. Industrial
Commission, 98 Utah 571, 102 P. 2d 300 (1940),
"We adhere to our previous decision to the effect
that whether applicant Foss-is entitled to
unemployment benefits must be determined from
the tests laid down in the Unemployment Compensation
Act, rather than from any common-law concepts
of master and servant." Id. at 303.
Of similar importance is Salt Lake Transportation
v. Board of Review, 5 Ut. 2d 87, 296 P. 2d 983 (1956).
There it was necessary for the Court to determine whether
taxi cab drivers were lessees or employees of plaintiff.
The Court in noting with approval the concession of
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the plaintiff said,
"Plaintiff concedes that it is well settled in
this jurisdiction that the meaning of terms
'employer' and 'employee' are determined by the
Act and are not confined to the common-law
concepts of their meaning. The Employment
Security Act having been enacted under the
police powers for the benefit of the general
public welfare its provisions are to be liberally
construed to effectuate that purpose. Therefore
this Court has held that the terms 'employment,'
'services' and 'wages' include many persons and
relationships and means of compensation not
contemplated by those terms under the common-law."
Id. at 984.
Rather than the common-law definitions, the appropriate
tests which the Court referred to in Creameries of America,
supra, are found in Section 35-4-22 (j)

(5) Utah Code

Annotated, 1953, wherein it states,
"Services performed by an individual for wages or
under any contract of hire, written or oral, express
or implied, shall be deemed to be employment
subject to this act unless and until it is
shown to the satisfaction of the commission that:
(A)

Such individual
to be free from
the performance
his contract of

(B)

Such service is either outside the usual
course of the business for which such service
is performed or that such service is pe~
formed outside of all the places of bus~ness
of the enterprise for which such service is
performed; and

(C)

has been and will continue
control or direction over
of such services, both under
hire and in fact;

Such individual is customarily engaged i~ an
independently established trade, occupat~on,
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profession, or business of the same nature
as that involved in the contract of service."
The Court, however, noted in Creameries of America,
supra, that the terms "seryices" and "personal services"
are not specifically defined by the Act, and then instructed,
"In ordinary usage the term "services has a rather
broad and general meaning. It includes generally
any act performed for the benefit of another under
some arrangement or agreement whereby such act was
to have been performed. The general definition of
"service" as given in Webster's New International
Dictionary is "performance of labor for the benefit
of another"; "Act or instance of helping, or benefiting". The term "personal service" indicates that
the "act" done for the benefit of another is done
personally by a particular individual." Id. at 304.
After discussing the definition other jurisdictions
have placed on "services", the Court in Creameries of
America, supra, ruled the broader meaning referred to in the
quote above is applicable.

The Court said,

"No indication is given in the Act that the
legislature intended to give a restricted meaning to such term. On the contrary the way in
which 'services' or 'personal services' appears
in our Unemployment Compensation Act indicates
an intention on the part of the legislature to
use the term in its broad general sense." Id. at 305.
The Court also ruled that "wages" under the act consist of
any remuneration paid by the employer for "services" or
"personal services" rendered.
Applying the principles set forth in the case, the
Court in Creameries of America, supra, held that the individual who had entered into a contract called a "Franchise
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-10Agreement" denominating him

as

~

dealer and granting him

the exclusive right to sell products of plaintiff was in
employment within the meaning of the Utah Employment
Security Act.

Creameries of America was later followed

in Leach v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 123
Utah 423, 260 P. 2d 744 (1953).

There the Court determined

that certain franchise dealers and contract installers
were in the employment of plaintiff within the meaning of
the Employment Security Act of Utah.

The Court reasoned,

"If the dealers and the installers rendered
services for the plaintiffs for wages or under
a contract of hire, then the plaintiffs had
persons in their employment and are liable
for contributions on their wages unless those
persons are excluded from the Act by the
exclusion test contained in Section 35-4-22
(j) (5) (A), (B), and (C), which test we will conside;
later in this opinion." Id. at 746.
Applying the broad definition in accordance with the
Court decisions referred to above, it is clear that
appellant performed services for his employer, Medexarn,
for which he received wages.

It is clear from the Record

that appellant was hired by Medexam to act as regional
manager and to conduct physical examinations.

Medexarn

received as much as 30 percent of the proceeds from medical
examinations performed by appellant which amount was later '
reduced to 10 percent.

In addition, Medexam was greatly
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benefited by appellants expanding the operations of
Medexam in northern Utah and southern Idaho.

As the operation

became larger, more revenue was generated for Medexam, and
the name "Medexam" became known over a larger area.

Clearly

the activities of appellant constituted acts performed for
the benefit of another under some arrangement or agreement
whereby the act was to have been performed.
There can be no doubt that the income received by appellant
from Medexam comes within the broad definition of "wages".
In Creameries of America, supra, the Court said,
"That the income received by Foss from the distribution
of products for plaintiff comes within the definition
of 'wages' is also evident. All remuneration
payable for personal services is 'wages'." Id. at 305.
There can be no question that appellant was in the
employment of Medexam for purposes of the Utah Employment
Security Act, and unless appellant is excluded from the
Act by the exclusionary tests contained in Section 35-4-22
(j)

(5)

(A),

(B), and (C), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, he

must be allowed benefits under the Utah Employment Security
Act.
POINT II
THE APPEALS REFEREE ERRED IN NOT APPLYING
EACH OF THE EXCLUSIONARY TESTS SET FORTH IN
SUBSECTIONS (A) , (B) , AND (C) OF SECTION 35-4-22
(j) (5) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, BECAUSE (A)'
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-12(B) , AND (C) ARE FRAMED IN THE CONJUNCTIVE SO
THAT ALL THREE TESTS MUST BE MET BEFORE AN EMPLOYEE
CAN BE EXCLUDED FROM COVERAGE UNDER THE UTAH
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT.
There can be no doubt that subsections (A) , (B), and
of Section 35-4-22 (j)

IC

(5) are framed in the conjunctive

so that all three tests must be met in order to exclude
appellant from unemployment compensation.

In Johanson

Brothers Builders v. Board of Review of Industrial Conunissio:'
118 Utah 384, 222 P. 2d 563 (1950) the Court found that ceru
persons were employees of plaintiff rather than partners
with plaintiff.

The Court ruled that such persons came

within the Employment Security Act because the work they
performed constituted services for plaintiff.

With regard

to the exclusionary tests, the Court instructed as follows,
"Furthermore, if we test the relationship by the
exclusions set forth in the quoted paragraph, we
find that the services performed by the workers
cannot be excluded. The subsections are conjunctive
and the wording requires that tests prescribed
by all three must be met before the relationship
can be excluded." Id. at 568.
The paragraphs referred to are the same as subsections
(A), (B), and (C) of Section 35-4-22

(j)

(5) Utah Code

Annotated, 1953.
In addition, in Leach v. Board of Review of Indust~
Commission, 123 Utah 423, 260 P. 2d 744 (1953), the court
after quoting the subsections (A),

(B), and (C) said,
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-13"It will be noted that the three requirements of
the test are stated conjunctively and hence all
three requirements must be met if the services
rendered for the plaintiffs are to be excluded
from the act." Id. at 748.
There can be no question that the Appeals Referee
failed to apply the definitions contained in the Utah
Employment Security Act to determine whether appellant
was in fact in employment within the Act.

The Appeals

Referee based his decision on the fact that Medexam,
in the opinion of the Appeals Referee, did not have
sufficient control over appellant, and therefore, appellant
was self-employed so that he could not qualify as a
person who was unemployed as that term is defined in
Section 35-4-22 (m) (l), Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Looking at the decision of the Appeals Referee in the
best possible light, it is apparent that the Appeals
Referee used only the exclusionary test contained in
subsection (A) of Section 35-4-22 (j) (5) Utah Code Annotated,
1953, in denying appellant unemployment compensation.
Excluding appellant from unemployment benefits, because
he came within only one of the exclusionary test was error.
The tests are framed in the conjunctive and the Appeals
Referee would have to have found appellant was excluded by
each of the tests in order to be excluded from being in

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-14-

employment under the Utah Employment Security Act.
POINT III
THE APPEALS REFEREE ERRED IN FINDING THAT
APPELLANT WAS FREE FROM THE CONTROL OR THE
DIRECTION OF MEDEXAM.
The Appeals Referee seemed to ground his decision
upon a finding that "there is no evidence that Medexarn
exercised control as to the means and manner of accomplish·
ment."

(R.0024)

There can be no doubt that the observation

of the Appeals Referee is in error when one reviews the
Reporter's transcript contained in the Record.

The Court's

attention is respectfully invited to page two of the
Reporter's transcript (R.0037) where the Referee asks,
"Q.

Now, did you have to select your own place
of business there or where did you work from?

A.

When I started out, I started at my home. I
worked out of my home. He had me working out
of my home.
(Emphasis added)"

Not only did Medexam direct appellant as to where he
should commence working, but it held absolute control
over the price he was to charge the insurance companies.
"Q.

Now, who sets the price for the exam?

A.

Medexam does.

Mr. Smith.

Q.

Mr. Smith. They set the price that you would
charge the defendant on the type of examination?

A.

Yes.

Some may require for instance, an EKG
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-15and then an additional charge would be made
for that.
Q.

And they tell you what you can charge?

A.

Yes. They give me the information as to
what you can charge.

Q.

In other words, the company sets the price.
Now are you able to change that price? Are
you at liberty to change that price -increase
it?

A.

No at one time I was charging as was instructed
so much for each item, and he instructed me,
'No, that is not right. We only charge this
set fee for the whole thing.'" (Page three
of the Reporter's transcript, R.0038)

Even in the situation where appellant might have
contacted the insurance agents who had not been previously
contacted by the horne office of Medexarn in Salt Lake City,
appellant was not at liberty to negotiate a price with them
but rather was controlled by the pricing schedule set by
Medexarn.

Additionally, even when appellant sought to

increase the wage he could earn by establishing branch
offices, the branch offices could only charge the fee that
Medexarn dictated to him.
It is also significant that the insurance companies
did not pay appellant directly, but rather all checks were
made payable to Medexarn as shown on page six of the
Reporter's transcript (R.0041) wherein it states,
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"Referee:

Now, then - those monies were not
actually received by you, is that
correct? They were paid by the
insurance companies to Medexam?

Blarnires: To Medexarn.

That is correct."

It should also be pointed out that Medexam controlled
all of the billing to the insurance companies as well.
As further evidence of control over appellant, Medexam
provided at no cost to appellant various supplies and
forms which appellant was directed to use in his work.
Also important is the control over the telephone listing.
As noted at page nine of the Reporter's transcript, (R.00441
the telephone number was listed under the name of Medexam,
and payment of the telephone bill was guaranteed by the
president of Medexam.
When Medexam terminated appellant, it retained the
telephone listing as "Medexam" and kept the same telephone
number.

Had appellant been an independent contractor, he

would have had the right to the telephone number under his
own name at the end of the contract with Medexarn.
When appellant finally found an office location
outside of his home, he signed the lease agreement "Craig
Blarnires, Medexam".

Each time appellant was terminated
•

I

· an d con t ~nu
· e the bus1ness'
by Medexam, Medexam wou ld step ~n
using the same name, same telephone number an d same busines:

I

I
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-17contacts generated by appellant.

In short, Medexam owned

and had control over everything including customer lists.
The actions of Mr. Smith, president of Medexam, in
controlling appellant are further evidenced by the following as found on page nine of the Reporter's Transcript,
(R.0044)
"Referee:

Well, now, these calls from Medexam,
what would they pertain to, do you know?

Blamires:

I don't know. There were a number that
were made. Mr. Smith came out there on
one occasion and demanded that he be able
to rearrange the office that was set up
there •.• "

Likewise, the Court's attention is invited to page ten
of the Reporter's transcript (R.0045) wherein the Referee
directed attention to Exhibit two.

(R.0026)

Mr. Smith

attempts to explain away Exhibit two as follows:
"Smith:

Yes this was brought up by Craig at the
last conversation and underlined 'All our
personnel are required to set up spe7if~c
goals in writing with management rev1ew1ng
their progress.' Now, that states exactly
what this memoranda did. My people, my
permanent employees in Salt Lake were
required to come up with some specific goals.
In the next paragraph, however, it says,
'I want from you a written list of goals'
in order to assist you, and it was not sent
out as a memoranda of requirement to anybody
except my own people."

In one breath Mr. Smith claims he did not say it was
necessary for appellant to prepare a list, and in the next
breath Mr. Smith says, "I want from you a written list
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of goals."
The purpose for Mr. Smith, president of Medexam,
wanting a written list of goals is evident from his 0~
testimony.

"I believe that our production will improve

each month if goal setting is a top priority with us."
(Page ten of the Reporter's transcript, R.0045)
After reviewing the entire record, there can be no
dispute as shown above that Medexam, by and through its
president, exercised control over almost every aspect of
Mr. Blarnires and not merely the limited control the Appeals

Referee mentioned.
As one of the supports for the Appeals Referee's
decision, the Referee points to the fact that appellant
was able to hire operators of branch offices.

It should

be remembered, however, that as the number of branch offices,
grew and their productivity grew, Medexam was a major
recipient inasmuch as Medexam received a portion of the
fees generated by the branch offices.

As an incentive to

appellant, Medexam permitted appellant to hire and negotiate i
the precentage of the fees which would be paid to the
branch office operators.

But the branch office operators

were controlled by Medexam and were required by Medexam to
charge the same fee for their services as were charged
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Additionally, appellant testified on page

eight of the Reporter's transcript, (R.0043)
"On several occasions, Medexam, if I was an
independent contractor, and if these were my
people, why would Medexam call personally my
people (I'm using this paraphrasing stuff)
calling up my people giving them directives,
'You do this, such and such.' I call them up
and find out that they have been told something
different, than I call them up. Why is it then
that they will obey Medexam and they won't obey
me? ••• "

Also it is important to note that according to appellant's
testimony on page fourteen of the Reporter's transcript,
(R.0049) each of the branch operators signed an agreement with Medexam.

In addition, as already pointed out,

Medexam, through its president, demanded that appellant
obtain a list of goals from each of the satellite operators,
and further, all of the fees generated by these satellite
offices were not paid to Mr. Blamires but were paid
directly to Medexam.

Medexam did all of the billings

for the branch offices as well.

And Mr. Smith threatened

to take away appellant the entire Idaho area confining

Mr. Blamires to the city of Ogden only.
It can be seen from the foregoing that there is
substantial convincing evidence in support of appellant's
contention that he was not free from control or direction
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In further support of appellant's position, is
Creameries of America, supra, wherein the Court upheld
the decision of the Appeals Referee who found that directic:
and control were exercised by the company over the claimant.
Some of the facts which gave rise to the Court's decision
are as follows:
a.

The claimant could not set his own prices

but was required to sell the companies products
at the price set by the company.
b.

The company collected money from the

customers.
c.

The company made suggestions and offered

advice as to how claimant should increase sales.
Many facts similar to those found in Creameries of
America are found in the case presently before the Court.

I

I

Another decision by this Court which is helpful is .[
Salt Lake Tribune Publishing Company v. Industrial Co~i~
99 Utah 259, 102 P. 2d 307 (1940).

There the Appeals

Commission found that certain carriers for the newspaper

1.

1

were within employment and further that they were not
excluded by the three tests contained in the Unemployment ,
Compensation Act.

Although the Act was contained in the
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to are the same as those contained in subsection (A), (B),
and (C) of Section 35-4-22 (j) (5) Utah Code Annotated,
1953.

Some of the facts the Court found helpful in

determining that the employer had the requisite control
over the applicant were as follows:
a.

The applicant was required to sell the

newspapers at a certain fixed price.
b.

The subscribers to the paper would pay

their bills directly to the company and not to the
applicant.
c.

Various individuals who worked for the

company would instruct the applicant concerning
delivery of their papers and generally kept check
on them to see that they did their work.
d.

The carriers received nothing from their

routes other than what was received by the distribution of the papers to the subscribers during
the lifetime of their contract with the company.
It is interesting to note that the Court ruled in favor
of the applicant even though the written contract between
the applicant and the company stated that the company had
no right of control, supervision, or direction over the
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applicant or the means or method by which he could
distribute or sell the newspapers.
When one reviews the facts as contained in the
Reporter's transcript and applies the law to the facts,
it is beyond question that appellant was not free from
control or direction by Medexam so that the exclusionary
test contained in subsection (A) of Section 35-4-22

(j)

(51

Utah Code Annotated 1953 has not been met.
POINT IV
THE APPEALS REFEREE ERRED BY FAILING TO
FIND THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT EXCLUDED FROM EMPLOYMENT BY SUBSECTION (B) OF SECTION 35-4-22 (j) (5)
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
The second exclusionary test contained in Section
35-4-22

(j)

(B)

(5) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is as follows:

Such service is either outside the usual course
of the business for which such service is
performed or that such service is performed
outside of all the places of business of
the enterprise for which such service is
performed; and •.. "

It is clear from the Record that appellant performed
physical examinations at a place which was known as
"Medexam".

The telephone number was listed under the

name of Medexam, and all pyhsical examinations performed
·
by appellant were performed at the Medexam o ff ~ce.

Althoug!.l

the Appeals Referee made no specific findings or decision
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(B), there was ample evidence from which the Appeals Referee
could have found that the test in subsection (B) was not
met so that appellant could not be excluded from being in
employment as defined by the Utah Employment Security Act.
The failure of the Appeals Referee to so find was error.
POINT V
THE APPEALS REFEREE ERRED BY FAILING TO FIND
THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT EXCLUDED FROM EMPLOYMENT
BY SUBSECTION (C) OF SECTION 35-4-22 (j) (5)
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
Subsection (C) of Section 35-4-22 (j) (5) contains
the third exclusionary test which is as follows:
(C)

Such individual is customarily engaged in
an independently established trade, occupation,
profession, or business of the same nature
as that involved in the contract of service.

In a well reasoned opinion, Chief Justice Wolfe said
in Leach v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 123
Utah 423, 260 P. 2d 744, (1953),
"In Fuller Brush Company v. Industrial Commission,
supra, we pointed out that a shoe shiner, ~n auto
mechanic, a plumber, and a barber meeet th~s
requirement because the services which they
perform emanate as a part of a business in which
they are engaged. They perform services for
others while in the pursuit of a business
independently established and ~n which.they.are
customarily engaged and for wh~ch serv~ce l~ke a
common carrier they hold themselves out to
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perfor.m. The plaintiffs urged that each dealer
was customarily engaged in the independently
established business of salesmanship. This
contention· is untenable. Requirement (C)
contemplates that the service rendered is a
part of, and is rendered in pursuance of, a
business of the person rendering the service,
independently established, in which that person
is customarily engaged. In other words the
'independently established business' must exist
independent of the services under consideration
in the sense that it is the whole-of which the
particular service is a part." Id. at 748.
It is apparent from the decision rendered by the
Appeals Referee which was affirmed by the Board of Review
that the Appeals Referee did not address the question of
whether appellant was engaged in an independently establish
trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same
nature as that involved in the contract of service.
failing to so rule, the Appeals Referee erred.

By

There is

ample evidence in the Record to support a finding that
appellant was not engeged in an independently established
trade, occupation, profession, or business.

Appellant

had performed the same kind of services for a company
entitled Body Meterics previous to his employment with
Medexam.

While employed by Medexam he acted as regional

manager and conducted physical examinations.
As in Leach, supra, when the appe 11 ant

Was

terminatec

by Medexam, he became unemployed and had to secure employrre:
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elsewhere.

He had no business established independently

of his relationship with Medexam.

·He had no business

from which his services with Medexam emanated, but he
was dependent on Medexam for his business.
CONCLUSION
It is apparent from the law as supported by the
facts that appellant, Craig Blamires, was within employment as contemplated by the Utah Employment Security Act
and was not excluded by any of the exclusionary tests
of the Act.

Appellant is therefore entitled to receive

unemployment compensation, and this Court should reverse
the decision of the respondent directing it to grant
to appellant unemployment compensation.
Respectfully submitted,
HESS, VAN WAGENEN, PAGE & HESS

Gerald E. Hess
Attorneys for Appellant
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